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Summary findings
Despite  the current recession  in many parts of the  He concludes,  among other things, that fiscal
OECD, fiscal  consolidation is likely in many OECD  contraction in the OECD will probably lcad to slower
economies in  the 1  990s. McKibbin  asks: Is fiscal  growth  over  the next several  years.  But the current and
consolidation in the OECD in a period of low growrh a  likely paths of fiscal  policy  are such that deficit reduction
recipe for global  stagnation? In particular, what effects  programs may have a stimulating  effect in the  short run,
are likely  in developing  countries?  as long as future fiscal  contraction is credible.  And fiscal
McKibbin  starts with an overview  of cuts in the U.S.  deficit reduction will probably increase  long-run output
fiscal  deficit proposed by the  Clinton administration  and  in the OECD through its effects  on savings  and
the extent to which European governments must cut  investment.
fiscal  deficits between now and 1997 to satisfy  deficit  Finally,  growth in the dcveloping  countries (at least
targets in the Maastricht  Treaty.  total growth) may not be impaircd ar all by fiscal
How changes in fiscal  policy  are transmitted  within an  consolidation in the OECD. The negative effects  of fiscal
economy and between that economy and thz rest of the  contraction  will occur through lower net exports of non-
world depends on whether those changes lead  to  OECD economies.  For developing  countrie.;  with open
permanent or temporary changes in government  saving;  capital markets, tlhc  initial reduction in demand rhrough
whether they are implemented  through government  lower exports  can be offset by the rcduction in interest
spending  or taxes; and whether the taxes fall on  rates following  an inflow of capital from the countries
households  or firms. The main channels  of transmission  with contracting fiscal  policy.
are through changes in  A significant  decline in real global  interest rates is
* Agents' expectations  about futuire  taxes  likely  to increase  growrh in developing  countries thar are
*  Interest rates  debt-constrained,  either directly (through private capital
- Exchange  rarcs  inflows)  or indirectly (by relaxing  the balance  of
a  Economic  activity.  payments  constraint, allowing more resources  to be
McKibbin  uses the MSG2 multicountry models to  channeled  to domestic investment  needs).
quantify  the ramifications  of those changes.
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1.  Introduction
Despite  the  current  OECD-wide  recession,  there  is  a  likelihood  of  significant  fiscal
consolidation  over the remainder of ti.o*  decade in many of the OECD economies.  In the United States,
the Clinton Administration  has  proposed and Congress has passed, a credible fiscal deficit reduction
package. In Europe, the Maastricht Treaty imposes a period of fiscal consolidation in most countries
within the EMS, as these countries attempt to reach targets for government debt and fiscal deficits that
are considered as preconditions for a move to a  single currency.  Other OECD countries such as
Australia and Canada have also announced intentions  to reduce fiscal deficits over the next few years.
Is fiscal consolidation within the OECD during a period of slow growth, a  recipe for global
stagnation for the remainder of the decade?A common argument is that the fall in government demand
necessarily  implies  a  fall  in  aggregate  demand  and  therefore  through  conventional  Keynesian
mechanisms, a  deficit reduction policy at this stage of the global business cycle would worsen the
recession. An alternative  argument is that because the fiscal consolidation  will be undertaken gradually,
long term interest rates will fall in the short run and this will help short term growth within the OECD.
By the time the fiscal cuts are actually implemented the world economy will already be growing
strongly and the negative demand consequences  of the consolidation  will largely be diluted.  Opponents
of this view argue that either interest rates are largely independent  of fiscal policy, or that interest rate
changes have little effect on real activity and the dominant outcome of fiscal consolidation will be the
negative impact on aggregate demand.
This paper focuses on this issue.  In particular, it presents some evidence on the impact of a
change in fiscal policy in major OECD economies. Section  2, gives an overview of the extent of cuts in
the fiscal  deficit proposed by  the  Clinton Administtion  as  weil  the extent  to  which  European
governments will need to cut fiscal deficits between now and  1997 if they are to satisfy the deficit
targets in the Maastricht Agreement.  In Section 3 the MSG2 multi-country model is used to focus on
the key channels through which fiscal policy influences the economy as well as suggesting quantitative
magnitude of the impact of the cuts.  A global model is essential for capturing the many channels
through which a change in fiscal policy influences global economic activity- In that section it is shown
that the transmission  of changes in fiscal policy within an economy and between that economy and the
rest of the world depends on a number of factors.  Among the many factors are: whether the change in
fiscal policies lead to pemaent  or temporary changes in government saving; whether the change in
fiscal policy occurs through changes in govermment  spending or through change in taxes; if taxes are
used  it matters  whether these taxes are  levied on  households or  firms.  The  major  channels of
transmission are through  changes in  agents expectations of future taxes, changes in  interest rates,
changes in exchange rates, and changes in economic activity.  In the MSG2  -model, a reduction in
government demand reduces overall economic activity because the Keynesian style multiplier more
than outweighs the stimulus caused by lower real interest rates and a weaker exchange rate.  However,
it is shown that if the path of fiscal reduction is pushed sufficiently into the future, the change in
interest rate and exchange rates which occur in the present, then it is possible for a deficit reduction
program to be stimulatory  in the short term.  When the cuts in spending finally occur there is still a fall
in aggregate demand but it is offset to some extent by the stimulus  from changes in asset prices.
In section 4. the empirical relevance of the various channels that are the basis for the simulation
results are reviewed.  The evidence from econometric studies as well as simulations from other multi-
country models are summarized. The evidence from econometric studies of the link between budget
deficits and  interest  rates and  between interest rates and  economic activity are  less than  robust.Effects  of Fiscal  Consolidation  in die OECD
However, one point that is seen when examining  the results from the MSG2 model is that the nature of
expectations about current and future changes in fiscal policy are crucial for the outcomes. Given that
reduced form correlations between key variables c:n change sign depending on the way the policy is
simulated, it is difficult to see how reduced form econometric results, of the form that dominate the
literature, are going be successful in finding  any strong empirical relationships between deficit changes,
interest rates and economic  growth that can act as a robust guide to policy.
A conclusion is summarized in section 5.  It is shown in this paper that fiscal contraction in the
OECD can lead to slower growth. However, the nature of the current and  expected paths of fiscal
policy are such that fiscal policy may be stimulative in the short run as long as future fiscal contractions
are credible. Fiscal deficit reduction can also raise long run output through higher saving but at some
stage during  the  fiscal consolidation it  is likely that  GDP will  fall as  factors of  production are
reallocated throughout  the economy.
2.  Fiscal  Scenarios
This section summarizes the current state of fiscal policy in the OECD as well as outlining
likely developments in the major OECD economies.  Two issues dominate the global state of fiscal
policy. The first is the recent passage in the United States of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, (OBRA-93, the first budget of the Clinton Administration). The second issue emerges from the
guidelines for policy convergence proposed in the Maastricht Agreement.
The Clinton Administration's recently passed budget, proposes significant cuts in future U.S.
fiscal deficits amounting to about 1.6 percent of GDP by 1997, relative to the earlier CBO baseline
projections for 1997. The extent of cuts relative to 3 alternative baseline concepts are shown in figure
1. This figure gives the path of deficits in billions of dollars, from 1994 to 1998 for baselines defined
as: "March 1993 capped baseline" (the CBO baseline from March 1993 assuming the caps on spending
imposed by  the Budget Enforcement Act  of  1990, are  applied); the  CBO estimate of  the  latest
Administration's baseline; and the uncapped baseline.  This figure also shows the new CBO estimates
for the OBRA-93.  Of the reduction in projected fiscal deficits, about 55% of the reduction is through
higher taxes, about 35%  through spending cuts and  10% through lower  debt servicing costs (see
CBO(1993)). Figure  1 shows that  if the budget is  implemented as  passed,  there are  likely to be
significant reductions in U.S. fiscal deficits by 1997 and in the years beyond. After 1998 the budget
deficit again begins to rise, primarily due to projections of exploding health care costs.  However, the
level of the deficit is permanently reduced relative to what it otherwise would have been.
The ocher  major potential shift in fiscal policy with global implications is the fiscal imnplications
of the Maastricht revision to the Treaty of Rome which was endorsed by  the European Council at
Maastricht in December 1991.  Under this agreement countries in the European Economic Community
have proposed implementing  a single currency in Europe by the end of this decade.  To be a participant
in this monetary union, countries should satisfy four indicators of policy convergence.  These criteria
are:  a) inflation must not exceed the average inflation rate of the three lowest inflation countries by
more  than  1.5%;  b)  interest rates on  long-term govermment  securities must  not  be  more  than 2
percentage points higher than the interest rate in the lowest three inflation countries; c) the currency
must have been within the narrow band of the ERM for two years without an  realignments; d) the
general government deficit should be no more than 3 percent of GDP and the ratio of govenment  debt
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to GDP must be approaching the benchmark of 60 % of GDP at a reasonable pace'.  Of these reference
indicators, the last criteria on fiscal deficits is the focus of this paper.
To give an indication of the current fiscal position in Europe, Figure 2 shows fiscal deficits
relat  ivc to GDP of EC countries in 1992.  This figure also contains a line indicating the Maastricht
guideline for fiscal deficits of 3% of GDP. Based on the fiscal deficits in 1992, it is clear that some
countries,  notably  Italy,  United Kingdom,  Belgium,  Greece  and  Portugal  need  to  undertake  a
significant fiscal consolidation  between now and 1997 if they are to satisfy the Maastricht guidelines for
fiscal convergence.  In many of these countries the fiscal deficits have worsened in  1993 due to  the
economic slowdown in Europe.  A similar, and indeed more extreme picture emerges from examining
the ratio of government debt to GDP for these economies. In this paper we ignore the debt targets and
concentrate merely on the deficit targets as these are more likely to be achievable in the time frame
considered (see Giovannini and McKibbin  (1992)).
Developments in the United States and Europe, suggest the following stylization of scenarios
for this paper. Fiscal deficit reduction in the United States will be around 1.6 Percent of GDP by 1997.
1  See IMF (1992),  Annex II on wThe  Maastricht Agreement  on Economic and  Monetary  Union'.
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In  Europe  the  amnount  of  possible  reduction  varies  across  countries  and  is  much  less  likely.
Nonetheless, the extent of reduction conditional on reaching the Maastricht targets by. 1997 would be:
France (1% of GDP); Italy (7% of GDP), United Kingdom (3% of GDP); and other EMS countries (2
% of GDP).  In the following sections we examine the global impact of fiscal reduction of these
magnitudes.  A key aspect of both the U.S. and European polices is that they are to be phased in
gradually over tiIne. This is the focus of the next section.
3.  The Global  Impact of OECD Deficit  Reduction
Understanding the major channels through which deficit reduction in  the OECD impacts on
countries within the OECD and throughout the world, requires a global model. We use the MSG2
model for severl  reasons.  First it has a clear theoretical fiamework which makes disentangling the
key channels of transmission relatively straightforward.  Secondly it is empirically based,  thus in
addition to the theoretical insights we can also uncover the magnitude of certain effects. Thirdly it has
been  shown to  be  able to  track  importat  events in the  global economy since the  1980s and  is
contin-ally being used and evaluated by a wide range of users inside governments and at academic
institutions.  We first describe the model briefly.  A number of deficit reduction scenarios are then
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considered.  The analysis proceeds sequentially  SD  that we can build intuition on key aspects of results.
First we focus on U.S. deficit reduction.  Within this we consider three alternative ways of reducing
the U.S. fisa  deficit by 1.6 percent of GDP 1 2:
*  cut in government spending on goods and services;
*  an increase in the household income ux  rate;
*  an increase in the corporate income tax rate;
To accentuate the role of expectations we also consider these policies in the context of:
*  a permanent deficit reduction policy;
*  a temporary deficit reduction policy; and
*  an anticipated, permanent deficit reduction policy;
In the third part of this sectibo we then show the results for a Clinton-budget deficit reduction
where we assume that 35% of the reduction in the budget deficit is through spending cuts and 55%
through a combination of higher corporate and personal income tax rates. The remaining saving on
lower debt servicing is endogenous to the model.  We thep show the results for a Maastricht deficit
reduction program in  Europe as  interpreted in section 2 above. Finally, we combine the U.S.  and
European deficit reduction policies to gauge an overall assessment of the impact of the two main fiscal
contractions on the global economy.
a)  The MSG2 Model
The  model  we  use  is  the  McKibbin-Sachs-Global  Model  (also  called  MSG2 model,  see
McKibbin and Sachs (1991)).  This model has a number of attractive features.  Most importany  it is a
global model which captures the interdependencies  in the flows of goods and capital between countries
that  typifies the  1990s. Its  major  strengths  include neo-classical long  run  properties,  consistent
intertemporal  accounting of national and international  stock-flow  relationships, and explicit treatment of
forward-looking expectations. The models ability to explain the world economy during the 1980's has
been shown in chapter five of McKibbin and Sachs (1991).
The MSG2 model encompasses major sectors of the economy at an aggregated level.  The
consumers  and  firms  specified  in  the model  are  a  mix  of:  (1)  intertemporal optimizers whose
expectations are postulated to be consistent  with the structure of the model and, (2) liquidity constAined
households and firms who do the best they can given existing budget constraints and incomplete access
to financial markets'. Expectations play a crucial role in fnancial markets where agents maintain their
non-human wealth in the form of equity claims on fims,  claims on the government and claims on
foreigners.  Arbitrage keeps the financial markets from diverging in their expected rates of return.  The
model also features a careful treatment of stock-flow relations such as: the accumulation of current
account deficits into foreign claims on domestic output, which has to serviced by future trade surpluses;
the accumulation  of fiscal deficits into a government debt tha has to be serviced from future revenues -
- though it does not have to  be completely paid off;  the accumulation of  invesunent flows into a
depreciating capital stock with which national output is produced.  Furthermore, the model maintains
2  This is scaled  to be approximately  equal  to the deficit  reduction  expected  to be achieved  by OBRA-93.
3  For empirical  evidence  see Campbell  and  Mankiw  (1990).
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an  equilibrium between  aggregate demand  and  aggregate  output so  that  demand  increases  will
precipitate a  rising price level as well as a  short term supply response.  In the long run,  output is
determined by the availability of factors of production such as labor, energy and physical capital (based
on neoclassical growth theory). Only changes in consumers'  rate of  time preference,  productivity
growth and population growth, therefore, can affect long-term output growth.  The level of long-term
output, on the other hand, can be influenced by short run saving and investment decisions given the
assumption of a wedge between the interest rate at which the government borrows and  the rates of
return on assets held by households and firms.  Global accounting identities are imposed in the model
by incorporating all regions of the world economy and the flows of goods and financial assets between
these regions. The version of the model used in this paper contains explicit sub-models for the United
States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, the Rest of the European Mone:ary System
(REMS), Canada, the Rest of the OECD, non-oil developing countries, oil developing countries, and
the eastern Europe economies with the Commonwealth  of Independent  States.
b)  Allteriive  Instnuments  for Deficit Reduction
In this section, three altemative means of achieving deficit reduction are considered.  The three
policies are: a reduction in government spending on goods ani services of 1.6% of GDP; an increase in
the average household income tax rate of 2.4 percentage points and an increase in the average rate of
tax on  corporate  income by  6.7  percentage points. These policies are  chosen so as  to  lead  to  a
reduction in the fiscal deficit if 1.6% of GDP by 1997.
As with any policy change in a model containing rational expectations, we must specify either
the entire future path of the policy or the policy rule.  In the case of fiscal policy we must also be
careful to specify the method of financing to be used. In this case we assume that each of the three
policies lead to a  reduction in government debt (i.e. decreasing the budget deficit). Any changes in
servicing the debt are assumed to  be  funded through lump sum tax changes on consumers.  For
example, a fiscal contraction today that cuts the deficit by 1.6 percent of GDP must be met at some
stage in the future by a tax reduction to cover the reduced cost of servicing a smaller stock of debt, if
the fall in the deficit is to remain at 1.6% of GDP.  These policies are considered in the context of an
announced pernanent  reduction in the fiscal deficit implemented  in 1993. There is no phasing in of the
policies.  Changes in spending and tax rates are selected such that the fiscal deficit reduction under
each policy is approximately equivalent by the year 1997.  In the short run there is no attempt .to
standardize the policies on the change in the fiscal deficit because each policy has a different cyclical
impact.
Figures 3 and 4 present results for the United States of a permanent reduction in the fiscal
deficit using the three alternative fiscal instruments.  Figure 3 contains results for real GDP, private
consumption, privaLe invesmewnt,  and the trade balance for  the United States. Figure 4  shows the
results for the nominal effective exchange rate, inflation, the share market, and 10 year bond rate for
the United States.  These figures show the deviadonfrom baseline of variables as a result of the policy
changes. These variables are scaled so that real GDP is measured as a percentage deviation from base;
private consumption, private investment  and the trade balance are measured as percent of baseline GDP
deviation from base (i.e. 0.5 percent is 0.5 percent of U.S. GDP in the year indicated); inflation and
the interest rate on 10 year bonds are measired  as percentage point deviation (i.e. -I  on the vertical
axis is a fall of 1 percent or 100 basis points); and the share niarket and the nominal effective exchange
rate are percentage deviation from base, where a fall in the exchange rate of 1 percent is a depreciation
of that country's exchange rate relative to an export weighted basket of other currencies.
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First, refer to the results for the permanent  reduction  in government  spending  on goods and
services  in figure 3 and 4.  The process  of adjustment  follows  the familiar results of the theoretical
Mundell-Fleming-Dombusch  models. The reduction  in government  demand  and the fall in government
borrowing  lead to a fall in interest  rates  in the United  States  (real and nominal,  short and long). This
leads to a capital  outflow  which  depreciates  the U.S. dollar by around 5.7 percent in effective  terms.
The large size of the U.S. economy  in world capital  markets  and the movement  of capital  out of the
United  States, leads  to a global  fall in interest  rates.  The fall in U.S. domestic  demand lowers  world
output  in the first year but is more than  offset  by the stimulative  effects  of lower  world interest  rates in
subsequent  periods.
The capital outflow  is reflected  in an improvement  in the U.S. trade balance  of around 0.6
percent of GDP in  1993.  This improvement  is gradually reversed over time.  The subsequent
deterioration  (relative  to baseline  but not necessarily  relative  to 1993)  reflects  the intertemporal  budget
constraint:  with a permanently  smaller stock of external debt, the future U.S. trade surpluses  that
otherwise would be  required to  service the  stock of  external debt are  now reduced. This  is
accomplished  by  a  gradual appreciation  of  the U.S. dollar relative to  baseline after the  initial
depreciation.
Inflation initially  rises due to  number of important  factors.  First, in the MSG2 model,
consumer  prices are used to measure  inflation. Consumer  prices  include  a rise in the price of imported
goods  reflecting  the depreciation  of the U.S. dollar. In addition  some  domestic  goods require  imported
inputs  into the production  process. As the U.S. dollar depreciates,  the cost of imported  inputs rise.
This leads  to a rise in output  prices.
The long terms positive  effect  on real GDP is driven  by the assumption  that, although  forward
looling, consumers  are not completely  Ricardian  in this model. They  discount  future income  streams
at a higher rate than the real interest rate on government  debt.  Thus when government  spending  is
reduced, to eliminate  excess supply in the long run, interest rates fall which stimulates  private
investment  in the long run. With  higher investment,  there is a higher capital  stock and a higher  capital
output  ratio. Thus the lower  real interest  rates are consistent  with a lower  marginal  product  of capital.
With  real wages  adjusting  to return  the economy  to fbil employment  in the long run, the level  of output
will be higher  due to the same  quantity  of labor inputs  but a higher  stock  of physical  capital.
Now compare  the results  under each of the three fiscal  instruments. The income  tax and the
cut in government  spending  have similar consequences  although  there are a number of interesting
differences.  In terms of real GDP, the spending  cut is more contractionary  in the short run that the
income  tax increase  but leads  to a higher  level of output  in the long run than the income  tax increase.
This can also be interpreted  in terms  of the balance  budget  multiplier  (adding  a spending  increase  to a
tax increase  so that the deficit  is unchanged).  This multiplier  is positive  in the short term and negative
in the long run. The long run result follows  because  consumers  are not completely  Ricardian  in this
model.  Thus a change  in government  spending  leads  to a change  in real interest rates in the long run,
as described  above. For a tax change  in the long run, the fall in interest  rates is smaller  than  the fall in
interest  rates  under a spendiiig  cut. The change  in the marginal  product  of capital  is also smaller  under
the inoome  tax and therefore  the capital  stock  rises by less under  the income  tax change. In the short
term, the standard  Keynesian  multiplier  is relevant. The spending  cut reduces  aggregate  demand  by
more than an equivalent  change  in taxes which are partly financed  by consumers  by a reduction  in
saving. Thus private consumption  does not fall by as much  as public  consumption  and the decline  in
aggregate  demand  is smaller  when taxes  increase.
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The  bigger  difference  in  terms  of  GDP  outcomes occurs  when  the  deficit  reduction  is
undertaken through increases in corporate taxes.  The corporate tax has different consequences on both
the aggregate demand and aggregate supply.  The higher corporate tax rate  , reduces the return to
private capital.  Thus private investrnent  decliiies. Even though real interest rates also decline by more
in this case, the impact of higher taxes on liquidity constrained firms far outweighs the stimulative
effect of lower real interest rates on real investment. There is also a  long run contraction in CDi?
because the lower rate of investment implies a lower physical capital stock in the longer rum.  Note
that the share market rises under each policy because of lower real interest rates.  However, the
sinilarity in share market outcomes does not imply similar investment  responses because of the role of
liquidity  constraints in investment.
The form of the defi,cit  reduction has quite different implications within the U.S.  economy.
This is also true in the transmission of these policies to other countries.  Although the MSG2 model
contains country detail on  a  number of  countries and  regions it  is convenient to  stummarize the
transmission of the fiscal change by focussing on results for the ROECD region.  These are shown in
Ftgure 5.
The quantitative results differ for each country but the qualitative  story is similar.  In the first
year of the fiscal contraction, there is a decline in ROEC-D  GDP.  This occurs because of the fall in
U.S.demand for goods from other countries.  The negative effects are reversed by 1994 because the
faU in global real interest rates stimulates private investment in non-U.S. economies.  This is seen
clearly in Figure 5.  It is also true that in the long run real GDP is higher in all countries.  This occurs
through the same mechanism as discussed above for the United States.  Lower long term real interest
rates must be consistent with a lower marginal product of capital in each country and therefore a higher
capital stock , which implies that output is permanently higher.
The results for foreign economies across the three fiscal instruments also differ.  The increase
in corporate taxes leads to a larger outflow of private capital from the U.S. which results in a larger
increase in physical capital in the rest of the world.  The higher path of future output and the larger fall
in real interest rates lead to a larger rise in non-U.S. share markets in the case cf the corporate tax
increase.
The consequences for countries outside the OECD are summarized in figure 5a.  The MSG2
model  does  not  contain  a  detailed internal macroeconomic structure  for  the  non-oil developing
countries.  It is assumed that these countries are constrained by the amount of lending offered by the
rest of the world.  The amount that these countries can borrow plus the revenue from exports is then
used to service outstanding debt and to purchase imported goods from each other region. Importantly it
is also assumed that this region pegs to the U.S.  dollar.  Figure 5a contains the results for the trade
balance and exports for this region.  The key transmission  mechanism  to this region is that for a given
capital account, lower interest rates imply a larger trade balance deficit can be run.  In addition with a
real and nominal depreciation relative to non-U.S. economies, real exports (defined in terms of US
goods) also  rise  due  to  substitution by  non-U.S.  industrial economies  towards  the  goods from
developing  countries.  Thus real imports  rise by more than the reductioin  in debt servicing costs.  In this
sense, the non-oil developing countries are better off.  In both the case of  non-U.S.  industrialized
economies  and economies with balance of payments constraints the U.S. fiscal contraction is on balance
positive.  The channels arc different in the sense that for ROECD economies, the assumption of open
capital markets leads to a stimulus to investment  through a reduction in real long term interest rates. In
countries with a balance of payments constraint due to incomplete access to global capital markets, the
benefits emerge from lower costs of servicing foreign debt.
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c)  Permanent  Versus  Temporaty  Versus  Andtipated  Policies
We now consider the different between the time path and permanencc of fiscal policy changes.
-Again we use the fiscal contracdon in the U-S. as the example.  We also  focus on a  reduction in
spending on goods and services because the intuition on the effect of the time path of policy follows for
each of the three alternative  means of deficit reduction.
Figures 6 through 8 contain results for the permanent cut in govermment  spending that we have
already analyzed.  In addition, we show results for a  temporary cut in government spending which
consists of a cut of 1.6 % of GDP in 1993 but spending returning to baseline from 1994 onwards.  The
third comparison is with a permanent cut in spending that is phased in from 1993 to 1996.  This policy
is a reduction of 0.4% of GDP in  1993, 0.8% of GDP in 1994, 1.2% of GDP in 1995 and  1.6% of
GDP from 1996 forever.  4
The results for the United States are shown in figure 6. In the case where the spending cut is
temporary, the initial fall in U.S.  GDP is largest; close to 1.4% relative to 0.5% for the permanent
policy.  This result is because the real interest rate reduction is much smaller and the exchange rate
depreciation is much smaller for a temporary change in government spending.  In addition to the larger
output effects, the consequences for trade are much smaller for the temporary policy. In the long run
there is no effect of this policy.
In contrast, the results for an anticipated (or phased in) policy are also shown in Figure 6.  A
key point to note is the initial rise in U.S. real GDP as a result of the policy.  This occurs because the
spending cuts are primarily in the futr  whereas the changes in asset prices stimulate demand in 1993.
The fall in interest rate acts as a stimulus, partly through intertemporal channels, but also because it
reduces liquidity constraints on a proportion of firms and households in the model.  In  addition, the
depreciation of  the  real  exchange  rate  stimulates net  exports  which  raises  aggregate  demand.
Eventually  the phased-in policy and the permanent policy lead to the same outcomes.
Figure 8 presents results for the transmission of the three types of spending cuts to the rest of
the world.  As with the results inside the U.S.  the transmission to other countries is quite different.
The negative effects of the policy for foreign GDP is again largest for the temporary policy because
there is little reduction in global real interest rates in this case.  Note that when the policy is phased-in,
the fall in interest rates in the rest of the world dominates any negative effects of the contraction in
U.S. output from 1994 dtrough 1997 and GDP in the rest of the world is permanently above baseline.
Thus  although  fiscal  contraction reduces output  at  some  point  in  the  country  undertaking  the
contraction, the timing of the cuts in fiscal deficits can be crucial for the sign of the transmission of this
policy to other countries.  This is an example where the changes in asset prices more than offset the
negative Keynesian  demand effects for each year.
Figure 8a shows the importance of the timing of spending cuts for  the transmission of the
policy to non-oil developing countries.  The temporary policy leads to a larger trade balance deficit in
the developing countries because of  the smaller  stimulus to  exports.  The  trade  balance actually
improves for the anticipated  policy because exports rise by less.
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d)  The Cnton  Budget
This section uses the stylization of the Clinton Budget discussed above to simulate the global
impacts of this particular fiscal package 4. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the consequences for the same
range of variables as considered above. Three lines are shown on each figure.  The solid line is the
OBRA-93 (or Clinton budget).  The dashed line is the outcome for of the Maastricht simnulation.  The
thick dashed line is the combination of both the Clinton budget and the Maastricht scenarios.  These
other results will be discussed  below.
Figure 9 shows that the stylized representation of the Clinton Budget reduces level of U.S.
GDP relative to baseline from 1993 through 2002'. The growth rate (seen from the slope of the GDP
line) falls from 1993 through 1997 but rises above baseline after 1997. This pattern is also reflected in
the paths for private consumption  and investment. This model projects a decline in the interest rate on
10 year bonds of about 120 basis points in 1993, followed  by additional declines in the following  years.
The budget package also leads to a'depreciation of the effective value of the US dollar by around 7
percent on impact.  This depreciation together with the contraction of domestic demand improves the
U.S. trade balance by 0.5 percent of GDP in 1993.  The Clinton Budget also improves the U.S. share
market by 3 percent in 1993.  This is despite the fall in real GDP but is because of the rise in bond
prices (or fall in real and nominal interest rates).  Despite the share market rise, private investnent
remains weak because of lower demand acting to constrain liquidity  constrained finns that invest out of
retained eamings.
The transmission of the Clinton budget to other countries is a combination of the results for
each individual component of spending cuts and tax increases.  In figure 11, ROECD GDP falls in
1993 but is above baseline by 1994.  The global fall in real interest rates stimulates non-U.S. private
investnent as well as non-U.S. share markets.  The rise in share markets outside the U.S. is reflecting
the higher expected  level of future output as well as the fall in real interest rates in these economies.
The results for non-oil developing countries are shown in figure 12. The Clinton budget raise
LDC exports in terms of U.S. goods and allows an increase in imports  of developing countries through
relaxing the balance of payments constraint through lower real interest rates.  These results follow
directly from the discussion of the individual  components  discussed above.
e)  The Fiscal Impicaions  of the Maasticht Agreement
In addition to showing the results for the Clinton budget, figures 9 through 12 contain results
for the Maastricht agreement. When interpreting these results, some care should be  exercised. The
results assume that in 1993 there is a new understanding  that fiscal consolidation in Europe will occur
from 1993 through 1997. In fact, the Maastricht Agreement has been a significant issue since 1991.
Some of the results, especially those for asset markets will not line up with the actual experience from
1993 .because  presumably some of the asset price story will have already occurred before the starting
4  See McKibbin  and Bagnoli  (1993)  for detailed  analysis  of the impacts  of the bhdget  that was originally
presented  to Congress  in ealy 1993.
s  In McKibbin  and Bagnoli  (1993)  as in Clark  and Symansky  (1993),  the Clinton  budget  that was proposed  in
February  actually  raised GDP in the early years because  of a greater initial rise in spending  as well as the
introducton  of an investment  tax credit  that  are absent  form  the  package  of measures  that passed  Congress.
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period of the simulation. It is probably  better  to interpret  these results  in terms of average  outcomes
from 1991  through  to 2012. Nonetheless  it is instructive  to treat the fiscal implications  of Maastricht  as
a surprise given that few of the countries  have actually  begun to undertake  the required  adjustments
necessary  to achieve  these  targets.
It is clear from figure  9 that the fiscal  consolidation  in Europe  is positive  for the United  States.
Real GDP in the United  States  rises in 1993  and continues  to rise over the period. This reflects  a rise
in private investment  and consumption  and occurs despite  a deterioration  in the trade balance that
occurs  due to dollar appreciation.  The U.S. share market  is also stimulated  through  the same  channel
of lower  interest  rates  and higher  expected  output  as we described  previously.
In figure 11 it is clear that the results for the ROECD  differ from those for the U.S. This
reflects the much closer traae ties between  the European  countries  in the EMS and many of  the
ROECD  economies. The slowdown  in European  demand  has a bigger negative  effect  on these other
countries. The consequence  for real GDP in each of the main EMS  members  is shown in figure 13.
Some  countries,  notably  Italy  experience  a significant  fall in real GDP. The extent  of the  contraction  in
GDP depends  on the severity of the fiscal contraction. In addition,  because trade is more highly
integrated  in Europe, the contraction  tends to slow growth in each country. A third point which is
important  is the assumption  that each country  remains  pegged  within  a small band to the deutschmark.
Since  we assume  no fiscal  contraction  in Germany,  those  countries  that undertake  a fiscal contraction
tend  to experience  a weakening  of their  currencies  relative  to the Deutschmark.  They  are then fbrced  to
raise interest  rates  to defend  the peg. This adjustment  reduces  output  further  in these  economies.
In figure 12 it is clear that in contrast  to the Clinton  package,  exports fall as a result of the
fiscal contraction  in Europe.  This reflects the appreciation  of the LDC exchange  rates in European
markets  as a results  of the assumption  that these  economies  peg to the US dollar. The appreciation  of
the dollar relative  to the European  economies  has an additional  problem for the non-oil  developing
economies. The fall in global  interest  rates  as a result  of the fiscal contraction  is insufficient  to offset
the short term constraint  that debt is assumed  to be primarily  denominated  in $US. As the dollar
appreciates  in real  terms the  developing  economies  the value  of external  debt  rises.
The combined outcome of  both the U.S.  deficit reduction program and the Maastricht
agreement  are shown  in figures  9 through  12. It is clear from these results  that gradually  contracting
together  is better for the U.S. and Europe  than either  going  alone. The main effect is through  lower
real interest  rates  which  relies  on the credibility  of the two programs.
4.  The Empirical Robustness  of the Main Channels
Thus far, the  paper has focussed  on the results  from one  particular  model. This  has been done
with the purpose  of highlighting  the main  channels  of transmission  within  the economy  and throughout
the global  economy,  of changes  in fiscal  policy  in the U.S. and  Europe. In addition  this provides  some
evidence  on the likely  magnitude  of affects.
There are a number  of important  determilnants  of the results above.  The first is the link
between  the contraction  in government  demand  and the contraction  in aggregate  demand. This channel
is unambiguously  negative (in the sense that a  reduction in government  demand tends to  lower
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aggregate  demand)  for the contracting  economy  as well  as being  negative  for the foreign  economy  for
unchanged  prices. Where  the ambigwities  arise  are through  the changes  in goods  and asset  prices. Te
important  link is between  the change  in the fiscal  deficit  and the change  in interest  rates, the change  in
interest  rates  and the change  in real activity,  and the change  in interest  rates which  affects  exchange
rates  and  through  that  channel,  net exports.
In terms  of the transmission  of the fiscal contraction  to other countries,  the key channels  are
through  the extent  of trade  between  the two  economies  as well  as the degree  of capital  mobility  (as well
as the assumption  about input  price changes  as is familiar  from early results  in the Mundell-Fleming
Model under alternative  wage assumptions  (see Bruno  and Sachs (1979)).  For example,  as U.S.
demand  contracts,  this reduces  imports  from other  economies  which  is a negative  demand  shock for
those  economies.  This is then  offset  through  lower  real interest  rates  if private  capital  flows  into those
economies.
There is a large literature  on the links  between  changes  in fiscal  deficits  and change  in interest
ates. In theory,  the link between  deficits  and interest  rates  depends  on whether  the deficit  change  is
due to a change  in taxes or a change  in spending  on goods  and services. In a Ricardian  world (see
Barro (1972))  there is no link between  interest  rates and deficits  caused  by a change  in taxes.  The
deficit  is internalized  by consumers,  and  thus total  saving  and total  investnent  does not change  as taxes
change. When government  spending  changes,  even in a Ricardian  model  there can be changes  in
interest  rates  during  the transition  to a new steady  state (see  Zhang(1993)  ).  A number  of tests of the
Ricardian  equivalence  proposition  tend  to reject  it (see  for example  Bernheim  ( 1987  )) although  even
this is not consensus  (see Seater(1993)).  The failure  of the extreme  form of Ricardian  equivalence
indirectly  provides  empirical  support  for the link between  deficits  and interest  rates.
More direct tests tend to be less clear. Evans (1985,1987)  and Barro (1989) found little
evidence  of the link  between  fiscal  deficits  and interest  rates. A comprehensive  survey  of the evidence
can be found in Barth  et al (1989). These  latter  authors  amongst  others  note the many problems  that
arise  in undertaking  the empirical  testing  including  the problem  of calculaing  real interest  rates  and the
appropriate  concept  of fiscal  deficit  to use in regressions.  In a recent  study,  using data on 13 OECD
countries  Tanzi  and Lutz (1991)  found  strong  positive  correlation  between  govermnent  debt and long
termn  interest  rates. The evidence  for fiscal  deficits  was less  clear but the results  for the link between
government  debt  and  interest  rates  appeared  robust  across  a range  of tests.
The link between  interest  rates  and real activity  is also open to some  debate.  The direct  linh in
the model  simulation  results  presented  above  are via private  investment.  The empirical  links  between
interest  rate and investment  are mixed.  In an early  survey  Jorgensen  (1971)  found a link between  the
two  via the cost of capital. However  more recent  surveys  by Clark (1979)  and Chirinko  (1991)  find
the cost of capital  to be relatively  insignificant  determinant  of private  investnent. These  studies  of the
link between  the cost of capital  and investment  all suffer  frm  the problem  of measuring  the relevant
variables. For example,  problems  of calculating  expected  inflation  for calculating  real interest  rates  as
well as problems  of capturing  tax effects  are large.  Other empirical  studies  that have couched  the
impact  of interest  rates  through  Tobin's  Q have  also met with little success. Even these studies  have
floundered  on the problem  of relating  the available  data to the relevant  economic  concept  The one
area where  the empirical  evidence  of investment  is giving  positive  results  is in the cash flow theory  of
investment. A number  of recent authors  have found empirical  support at the macroeconomic  and
individual  firn  level that the availability  of funds widhin  the finm is an empincally important
determiant of investment  (see  for example  Fazzari  (1993),  Fazzari,  Hubbard  and  Petersen  (1988)).
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In the MSG2  model  private  investment  is partly  determined  by Tobin ts Q and partly  by current
fim profitability.  Lower  real  interest  rates raise  Tobin's  Q but  also increase  the cash flow  of firms  and
this  is an important  determinant  of the changes  in investment  in the model. The interest  rates  reduction
from deficit  reduction  acts both through  the cost of capital  channels  as well as through  the liquidity
constraint  chlnnel.
The final important  channel  for the positive  effects  of a unilateral  change  in fiscal  policy  is via
the exchange  rate.  As interest rates fall, the exchange  rate of the country undergoing  the fiscal
consolidation  depreciates  in response  to the outflow  of private capital. The evidence  on the links
between  interest  rates  and exchange  rates is also mixed. In a recent  study,  Bosworth  (1993)  surveys
the literature  on this link and presents  empirical  support  for this link as well as the link between
exchange  rate changes  and  changes  in net exports.
Evidencefrom Large Scale Models
The results  from the MSG2  model  have  been analyzed  in depth.  Results  from other multi-
country  models  tend to support  the results presented  above  in the following  sense.  In Bryant  et al
(1986) a number of models  performed  standardized  simulations  of a fiscal expansion  which was
permanent  and unanticipated. In that study, the fiscal  expansion  uniformly  raised real GDP in the
country undergoing  the fiscal stimulus  and also raised GDP in foreign economies. The  fiscal expansion
also increased interest rates in all models.  In a more recent model comparison project summarized in
Bryanr and McKibbin  (1994), the positive  fiscal multiplier  is again found across all models although  the
size of the multiplier is lower than in the earlier model comparisons, primarily because of greater
changes in real interest rates and exchange rates in the models  compared in the updated  study.
The issue of the impact of phased-in  fiscal contractions  is less clear.  In models such as Project
Link, DRI, GEM' etc, even a phased in fiscal contraction  is contractionary for output. However these
models have limited role for changes in asset prices and/or do not have forward looldng asset prices.
The other multi-country model that has extensively analyzed phased in fiscal contractions is  the
MULTIMOD model at the IMF.  In a recent study of the Clinton progrmm the results have been
similar to those for the MSG2 model.  In Clark and Symansky  (1993) for example, the Clinton budget
program raises GDP in 1993, reduces GDP in the years from 1994 through 1997 but then lead to GDP
above baseline from 1998. It should be noted that the initial raise in GDP is due to a  small fiscal
stimulus  that was included  in  ihe  orginally proposed  budget. When only a phased -in fiscal contraction
is considered, GDP falls for a number of years being rising in the long run.  In MULTIMOD, a rise in
private investment  and net exports both significantly  dampen the fall in GDP.  The mechanism is the
same as that found in the MSG2 model.  The fiscal contraction  in the U.S. does not lower real GDP of
industrial economies  but does initially  lower real GDP of developing  countries in that study.
5. Condlusion
This paper  has presented  results  for the impact  of fiscal  consolidation  in the United  States  and
Europe.  It is shown that a credible  reduction  of fiscal  deficits  that is phased-in  need not reduce
aggregate  demand  in the short  term.  Over time  as spending  is cut or taxes  raised,  there is a negaive
'  See  Allen  and  Vines  (1993)  for  results  from  the  GEM  model.
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impact on aggregate demand.  In the long run output is above baseline due to higher aggregate saving.
Although the intertemporal consequences  working through expectations  are important for this result,
the key effect is on the consequence of lower interest rates on the return to investment  but also on the
cash flow of firms which stimulates  private investment. A number of different scenarios for deficit
reduction including spending cuts, and corporate or household income tax increases are presented.In
addition the important difference  between temporary, permanent and anticipated policies is illustrated.
From these results it is difficult to see how simple reduced form econometric  studies of the relationship
between deficit reduction and interest rates could provide robust results.  Indeed the empirical literature
on the key parts of the transmission  mechanism  is mixed.
The consequence of  fiscal consolidation in the  United States and  Europe on other OECD
economies  and on developing countries  are quite different. For countries  with open capital markets, the
transmission  of the OECD fial  contractions  are positive as long as the United States and Europe are
not large trading partners for these economies.  For other countries that are debt constrained, the
significant  fall in real interest rates is likely to raise growth in these economics either direcdy through
private capital inflows or indirectly by relaxing the balance of payments constraint, allowing more
resources to be channeled  to domestic investment  needs.
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